Tag: Cyber Threats

A human rights lawyer from Pakistan’s Balochistan province received a suspicious link on WhatsApp from an unknown number, marking the first time a civil society member in the country was targeted by Intellexa’s Predator spyware, Amnesty International said in a report.

The link, the non-profit organization said, is a “Predator attack attempt based on the technical behaviour of the infection server, and on specific characteristics of the one-time infection link which were consistent with previously observed Predator 1-click links.” Pakistan has dismissed the allegations, stating “there is not an iota of truth in it.”

The findings come from a new joint investigation published in collaboration with Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Greek news site Inside Story, and Swiss tech site Inside IT. It’s based on documents and other materials leaked from the company, including internal documents, sales and marketing material, and training videos.

Intellexa is the maker of a mercenary spyware tool called Predator that, similar to NSO Group’s Pegasus, can covertly harvest sensitive data from targets’ Android and iOS devices without their knowledge. The leaks show that Predator has also been marketed as Helios, Nova, Green Arrow, and Red Arrow.

Often, this involves using different initial access vectors like messaging platforms that weaponize previously undisclosed flaws to stealthily install the spyware either via a zero-click or 1-click approach. The attack, therefore, requires a malicious link to be opened in the target’s phone in order to trigger the infection.

Should the victim end up clicking the booby-trapped link, a browser exploit for Google Chrome (on Android) or Apple Safari (on iOS) is loaded to gain initial access to the device and download the main spyware payload. According to data from Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), Intellexa has been linked to the exploitation of the following zero-days, either developed in-house or procured from external entities –

One such iOS zero-day exploit chain used against targets in Egypt in 2023 involved leveraging CVE-2023-41993 and a framework named JSKit to perform native code execution. GTIG said it observed the same exploit and framework used in a watering hole attack orchestrated by Russian government-backed hackers against Mongolian government websites, raising the possibility that the exploits are being sourced from a third-party.

Marketing brochure presenting the capabilities of Intellexa’s spyware product

“The JSKit framework is well maintained, supports a wide range of iOS versions, and is modular enough to support different Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) bypasses and code execution techniques,” Google explained. “The framework can parse in-memory Mach-O binaries to resolve custom symbols and can ultimately manually map and execute Mach-O binaries directly from memory.”

Screenshot of an example PDS (Predator Delivery Studio) dashboard interface used to manage targets and view collected surveillance data

Following the exploitation of CVE-2023-41993, the attack moved to the second stage to break out of the Safari sandbox and execute an untrusted third-stage payload dubbed PREYHUNTER by taking advantage of CVE-2023-41991 and CVE-2023-41992. PREYHUNTER consists of two modules –

• Watcher, which monitors crashes, makes sure that the infected device does not exhibit any suspicious behavior, and proceeds to terminate the exploitation process if such patterns are detected
• Helper, which communicates with the other parts of the exploit via a Unix socket and deploys hooks to record VoIP conversations, run a keylogger, and capture pictures from the camera

Intellexa is also said to be using a custom framework that facilitates the exploitation of various V8 flaws in Chrome – i.e., CVE-2021-38003, CVE-2023-2033, CVE-2023-3079, CVE-2023-4762, and CVE-2025-6554 – with the abuse of CVE-2025-6554 observed in June 2025 in Saudi Arabia.

Once the tool is installed, it collects data from messaging apps, calls, emails, device locations, screenshots, passwords, and other on-device information and exfiltrates them to an external server physically located in the customer’s country. Predator also comes fitted with the ability to activate the device’s microphone to silently capture ambient audio and leverage the camera to take photos.

The company, along with some key executives, was subjected to U.S. sanctions last year for developing and distributing the surveillance tool and undermining civil liberties. Despite continued public reporting, Recorded Future’s Insikt Group disclosed in June 2025 that it detected Predator-related activity in over a dozen countries, primarily in Africa, suggesting “growing demand for spyware tools.”

Perhaps the most significant revelation is that people working at Intellexa allegedly had the capability to remotely access the surveillance systems of at least some of its customers, including those located on the premises of its governmental customers, using TeamViewer.

“The fact that, at least in some cases, Intellexa appears to have retained the capability to remotely access Predator customer logs – allowing company staff to see details of surveillance operations and targeted individuals raises questions about its own human rights due diligence processes,” Jurre van Bergen, technologist at Amnesty International Security Lab, said in a news release.

“If a mercenary spyware company is found to be directly involved in the operation of its product, then by human rights standards, it could potentially leave them open to claims of liability in cases of misuse and if any human rights abuses are caused by the use of spyware.”

The report has also highlighted the different delivery vectors adopted by Intellexa to trigger the opening of the malicious link without the need for the target to manually click on it. This includes tactical vectors like Triton (disclosed in October 2023), Thor, and Oberon (both unknown at this stage), as well as strategic vectors that are delivered remotely via the internet or mobile network.

The three strategic vectors are listed below –

• Mars and Jupiter, which are network injection systems that require cooperation between the Predator customer and the victim’s mobile operator or internet service provider (ISP) to stage an adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attack by waiting for the target to open an unencrypted HTTP website to activate the infection or when the target visits a domestic HTTPS website that’s been already intercepted using valid TLS certificates.
• Aladdin, which exploits the mobile advertising ecosystem to carry out a zero-click attack that’s triggered simply upon viewing the specially-crafted ad. The system is believed to have been under development since at least 2022.

“The Aladdin system infects the target’s phone by forcing a malicious advertisement created by the attacker to be shown on the target’s phone,” Amnesty said. “This malicious ad could be served on any website which displays ads.”

Mapping of Intellexa’s corporate web linked to Czech cluster

Google said the use of malicious ads on third-party platforms is an attempt to abuse the advertising ecosystem for fingerprinting users and redirecting targeted users to Intellexa’s exploit delivery servers. It also said it worked with other partners to identify the companies Intellexa created to create the ads and shut those accounts.

In a separate report, Recorded Future said it discovered two companies called Pulse Advertise and MorningStar TEC that appear to be operating in the advertising sector and are likely tied to the Aladdin infection vector. Furthermore, there is evidence of Intellexa customers based in Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Angola, and Mongolia still communicating with Predator’s multi-tiered infrastructure.

“In contrast, customers in Botswana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Egypt ceased communication in June, May, and March 2025, respectively,” it added. “This may indicate that these entities discontinued their use of Predator spyware around those times; however, it is also possible that they merely modified or migrated their infrastructure setups.”

Most MSPs and MSSPs know how to deliver effective security. The challenge is helping prospects understand why it matters in business terms. Too often, sales conversations stall because prospects are overwhelmed, skeptical, or tired of fear-based messaging.

That’s why we created “Getting to Yes”: An Anti-Sales Guide for MSPs. This guide helps service providers transform resistance into trust and turn sales conversations into long-term partnerships.

In the guide, you’ll learn how to shift from persuasion to partnership, uncover what really drives objections, and lead with credibility as a trusted cyber advisor.

Why Traditional Cybersecurity Sales Strategies Don’t Work

Today’s buyers aren’t saying “no” to your services because they don’t care about security. They’re saying “no” because they don’t understand what they’re hearing.

Most SMBs already know cybersecurity is important. In fact, 57% call it a top priority. However, they’re lost in complexity, jargon, and vendor noise. When MSPs respond by “selling harder,” it only fuels skepticism.

What prospects actually want is confidence. They want to know: Will this protect my business, my reputation, and my bottom line?

Your role as an MSP is to bridge that gap and help clients connect cybersecurity to what truly matters: uptime, revenue, and resilience. To do that, you first need to understand why prospects hesitate.

Below are five of the most common objections MSPs hear from prospects, along with strategies to turn each one into an opportunity to educate and build trust. (For the complete list of the top 10 objections and strategies to overcome them, download the “Getting to Yes” guide.)

Top 5 Cybersecurity Sales Objections

Why prospects hesitate, and how to respond.

1. “It’s too expensive.”
   
   Security feels like a cost center.
   
   √ Reframe it as business protection that safeguards revenue and uptime.
2. “We’re already protected.”
   
   Basic tools feel “good enough.”
   
   √ A quick assessment often reveals hidden gaps and outdated defenses.
3. “We’re too small to be a target.”
   
   SMBs make up most ransomware victims.
   
   √ No business is “too small”, only underprepared.
4. “It’s too complicated.”
   
   Jargon and acronyms create confusion.
   
   √ Simplify the story. Clarity builds confidence and momentum.
5. “We don’t have time for this.”
   
   Security feels like extra work.
   
   √ Show how managed services save time and reduce operational noise.

These objections are often based on perception rather than fact. Responding with empathy, clear education, and real evidence is how trust is built, and where the trust-first conversation begins.

For more in-depth guidance and examples on how to prove value and build trust through measurable outcomes, download the full “Getting to Yes” guide.

Building a “Yes” Environment

Trust is created through structure, consistency, and clear communication. When clients can see steady progress and tangible value at every step, confidence grows naturally.

1. Create regular, value-driven touchpoints: Start with an initial assessment, follow with a collaborative workshop, and maintain quarterly business reviews to keep the partnership strategic.
2. Make progress measurable: Establish a baseline, share dashboards, and connect every action to ROI.

Putting Trust Into Action with Automation

Automation makes the trust-first model repeatable, scalable, and consistent. The right tools help MSPs streamline their process and focus on what matters most: building stronger client relationships.

Automated platforms, like Cynomi, enable providers to:

• Accelerate discovery with fast, accurate assessments and framework mapping
• Prove value instantly through posture dashboards and measurable progress reports
• Identify upsell opportunities by uncovering gaps and emerging client needs
• Standardize delivery across accounts with repeatable, data-driven workflows

By combining automation with human expertise, MSPs gain the visibility, structure, and credibility to scale their cybersecurity business and build lasting trust with every client.

The Secret Was Never About Selling

Successful MSPs win by guiding with clarity and confidence. They act as trusted advisors, helping clients see where risk meets business reality and how smart security decisions enable growth.

They combine human expertise with automated platforms that simplify assessments, visualize progress, and prove value at every stage. By focusing on education, transparency, and measurable outcomes, they shift the conversation toward value, resilience, and long-term partnerships. When trust leads the way, every discussion becomes a step toward collaboration and lasting success.

The “Getting to Yes” Guide for MSPs provides a clear and practical roadmap for leveraging trust and automation as your most powerful growth driver.

Download Getting to Yes: An Anti-Sales Guide for MSPs to learn more.

Dec 05, 2025Ravie LakshmananVulnerability / Software Security

Two hacking groups with ties to China have been observed weaponizing the newly disclosed security flaw in React Server Components (RSC) within hours of it becoming public knowledge.

The vulnerability in question is CVE-2025-55182 (CVSS score: 10.0), aka React2Shell, which allows unauthenticated remote code execution. It has been addressed in React versions 19.0.1, 19.1.2, and 19.2.1.

According to a new report shared by Amazon Web Services (AWS), two China-linked threat actors known as Earth Lamia and Jackpot Panda have been observed attempting to exploit the maximum-severity security flaw.

“Our analysis of exploitation attempts in AWS MadPot honeypot infrastructure has identified exploitation activity from IP addresses and infrastructure historically linked to known China state-nexus threat actors,” CJ Moses, CISO of Amazon Integrated Security, said in a report shared with The Hacker News.

Specifically, the tech giant said it identified infrastructure associated with Earth Lamia, a China-nexus group that was attributed to attacks exploiting a critical SAP NetWeaver flaw (CVE-2025-31324) earlier this year.

The hacking crew has targeted sectors across financial services, logistics, retail, IT companies, universities, and government organizations across Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

The attack efforts have also originated from infrastructure related to another China-nexus cyber threat actor known as Jackpot Panda, which has primarily singled out entities that are either engaged in or support online gambling operations in East and Southeast Asia.

Jackpot Panda, per CrowdStrike, is assessed to be active since at least 2020, and has targeted trusted third-party relationships in an attempt to deploy malicious implants and gain initial access. Notably, the threat actor was connected to the supply chain compromise of a chat app known as Comm100 in September 2022. The activity is tracked by ESET as Operation ChattyGoblin.

It has since emerged that a Chinese hacking contractor, I-Soon, may have been involved in the supply chain attack, citing infrastructure overlaps. Interestingly, attacks mounted by the group in 2023 have primarily focused on Chinese-speaking victims, indicating possible domestic surveillance.

“Beginning in May 2023, the adversary used a trojanized installer for CloudChat, a China-based chat application popular with illegal, Chinese-speaking gambling communities in Mainland China,” CrowdStrike said in its Global Threat Report released last year.

“The trojanized installer served from CloudChat’s website contained the first stage of a multi-step process that ultimately deployed XShade – a novel implant with code that overlaps with Jackpot Panda’s unique CplRAT implant.”

Amazon said it also detected threat actors exploiting 2025-55182 along with other N-day flaws, including a vulnerability in NUUO Camera (CVE-2025-1338, CVSS score: 7.3), suggesting broader attempts to scan the internet for unpatched systems.

The observed activity involves attempts to run discovery commands (e.g., whoami), write files (“/tmp/pwned.txt”), and read files containing sensitive information (e.g., “/etc/passwd”).

“This demonstrates a systematic approach: threat actors monitor for new vulnerability disclosures, rapidly integrate public exploits into their scanning infrastructure, and conduct broad campaigns across multiple Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) simultaneously to maximize their chances of finding vulnerable targets,” Moses said.

Cloudflare Blames Outage on React2Shell Patch

The development comes as Cloudflare experienced a brief but widespread outage that caused websites and online platforms to return a “500 Internal Server Error” message.

“A change made to how Cloudflare’s Web Application Firewall parses requests caused Cloudflare’s network to be unavailable for several minutes this morning,” the web infrastructure provider said in a statement Friday. “This was not an attack; the change was deployed by our team to help mitigate the industry-wide vulnerability disclosed this week in React Server Components.”

Dec 05, 2025Ravie LakshmananApplication Security / Vulnerability

A critical security flaw has been disclosed in Apache Tika that could result in an XML external entity (XXE) injection attack.

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2025-66516, is rated 10.0 on the CVSS scoring scale, indicating maximum severity.

“Critical XXE in Apache Tika tika-core (1.13-3.2.1), tika-pdf-module (2.0.0-3.2.1) and tika-parsers (1.13-1.28.5) modules on all platforms allows an attacker to carry out XML External Entity injection via a crafted XFA file inside of a PDF,” according to an advisory for the vulnerability.

It affects the following Maven packages –

• org.apache.tika:tika-core >= 1.13, <= 3.2.1 (Patched in version 3.2.2)
• org.apache.tika:tika-parser-pdf-module >= 2.0.0, <= 3.2.1 (Patched in version 3.2.2)
• org.apache.tika:tika-parsers >= 1.13, < 2.0.0 (Patched in version 2.0.0)

XXE injection refers to a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with an application’s processing of XML data. This, in turn, makes it possible to access files on the application server file system and, in some cases, even, achieve remote code execution.

CVE-2025-66516 is assessed to be the same as CVE-2025-54988 (CVSS score: 8.4), another XXE flaw in the content detection and analysis framework that was patched by the project maintainers in August 2025. The new CVE, the Apache Tika team said, expands the scope of affected packages in two ways.

“First, while the entrypoint for the vulnerability was the tika-parser-pdf-module as reported in CVE-2025-54988, the vulnerability and its fix were in tika-core,” the team said. “Users who upgraded the tika-parser-pdf-module but did not upgrade tika-core to >= 3.2.2 would still be vulnerable.”

“Second, the original report failed to mention that in the 1.x Tika releases, the PDFParser was in the “org.apache.tika:tika-parsers” module.”

In light of the criticality of the vulnerability, users are advised to apply the updates as soon as possible to mitigate potential threats.

Dec 05, 2025Ravie LakshmananEmail Security / Threat Research

A new agentic browser attack targeting Perplexity’s Comet browser that’s capable of turning a seemingly innocuous email into a destructive action that wipes a user’s entire Google Drive contents, findings from Straiker STAR Labs show.

The zero-click Google Drive Wiper technique hinges on connecting the browser to services like Gmail and Google Drive to automate routine tasks by granting them access to read emails, as well as browse files and folders, and perform actions like moving, renaming, or deleting content.

For instance, a prompt issued by a benign user might look like this: “Please check my email and complete all my recent organization tasks.” This will cause the browser agent to search the inbox for relevant messages and perform the necessary actions.

“This behavior reflects excessive agency in LLM-powered assistants where the LLM performs actions that go far beyond the user’s explicit request,” security researcher Amanda Rousseau said in a report shared with The Hacker News.

An attacker can weaponize this behavior of the browser agent to send a specially crafted email that embeds natural language instructions to organize the recipient’s Drive as part of a regular cleanup task, delete files matching certain extensions or files that are not inside any folder, and review the changes.

Given that the agent interprets the email message as routine housekeeping, it treats the instructions as legitimate and deletes real user files from Google Drive without requiring any user confirmation.

“The result: a browser-agent-driven wiper that moves critical content to trash at scale, triggered by one natural-language request from the user,” Rousseau said. “Once an agent has OAuth access to Gmail and Google Drive, abused instructions can propagate quickly across shared folders and team drives.”

What’s notable about this attack is that it neither relies on a jailbreak or a prompt injection. Rather, it achieves its goal by simply being polite, providing sequential instructions, and using phrases like “take care of,” “handle this,” and “do this on my behalf,” that shift the ownership to the agent.

In other words, the attack highlights how sequencing and tone can nudge the large language model (LLM) to comply with malicious instructions without even bothering to check if each of those steps is actually safe.

To counter the risks posed by the threat, it’s advised to take steps to secure not just the model, but also the agent, its connectors, and the natural language instructions it follows through.

“Agentic browser assistants turn everyday prompts into sequences of powerful actions across Gmail and Google Drive,” Rousseau said. “When those actions are driven by untrusted content (especially polite, well-structured emails) organizations inherit a new class of zero-click data-wiper risk.”

HashJack Exploits URL Fragments for Indirect Prompt Injection

The disclosure comes as Cato Networks demonstrated another attack aimed at artificial intelligence (AI)-powered browsers that hides rogue prompts after the “#” symbol in legitimate URLs (e.g., “www.example[.]com/home#<prompt>”) to deceive the agents into executing them. The technique has been dubbed HashJack.

In order to trigger the client-side attack, a threat actor can share such a specially crafted URL via email, social media, or by embedding it directly on a web page. Once the victim loads the page and asks the AI browser a relevant question, it executes the hidden prompt.

“HashJack is the first known indirect prompt injection that can weaponize any legitimate website to manipulate AI browser assistants,” security researcher Vitaly Simonovich said. “Because the malicious fragment is embedded in a real website’s URL, users assume the content is safe while hidden instructions secretly manipulate the AI browser assistant.”

Following responsible disclosure, Google classified it as “won’t fix (intended behavior)” and low severity, while Perplexity and Microsoft have released patches for their respective AI browsers (Comet v142.0.7444.60 and Edge 142.0.3595.94). Claude for Chrome and OpenAI Atlas have been found to be immune to HashJack.

It’s worth noting that Google does not treat policy-violating content generation and guardrail bypasses as security vulnerabilities under its AI Vulnerability Reward Program (AI VRP).

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Thursday released details of a backdoor named BRICKSTORM that has been put to use by state-sponsored threat actors from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to maintain long-term persistence on compromised systems.

“BRICKSTORM is a sophisticated backdoor for VMware vSphere and Windows environments,” the agency said. “BRICKSTORM enables cyber threat actors to maintain stealthy access and provides capabilities for initiation, persistence, and secure command-and-control.”

Written in Golang, the custom implant essentially gives bad actors interactive shell access on the system and allows them to browse, upload, download, create, delete, and manipulate files

The malware, mainly used in attacks targeting governments and information technology (IT) sectors, also supports multiple protocols, such as HTTPS, WebSockets, and nested Transport Layer Security (TLS), for command-and-control (C2), DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) to conceal communications and blend in with normal traffic, and can act as a SOCKS proxy to facilitate lateral movement.

The cybersecurity agency did not disclose how many government agencies have been impacted or what type of data was stolen. The activity represents an ongoing tactical evolution of Chinese hacking groups, which have continued to strike edge network devices to breach networks and cloud infrastructures.

In a statement shared with Reuters, a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington rejected the accusations, stating the Chinese government does not “encourage, support, or connive at cyber attacks.”

BRICKSTORM was first documented by Google Mandiant in 2024 in attacks linked to the zero-day exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887). The use of the malware has been attributed to two clusters tracked as UNC5221 and a new China-nexus adversary tracked by CrowdStrike as Warp Panda.

Earlier this September, Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) said they observed legal services, software-as-a-service (SaaS) providers, Business Process Outsourcers (BPOs), and technology sectors in the U.S. being targeted by UNC5221 and other closely related threat activity clusters to deliver the malware.

A key feature of the malware, per CISA, is its ability to automatically reinstall or restart itself by means of a self-monitoring function that allows its continued operation in the face of any potential disruption.

In one case detected in April 2024, the threat actors are said to have accessed a web server inside an organization’s demilitarized zone (DMZ) using a web shell, before moving laterally to an internal VMware vCenter server and implanting BRICKSTORM. However, many details remain unknown, including the initial access vector used in the attack and when the web shell was deployed.

The attackers have also been found to leverage the access to obtain service account credentials and laterally move to a domain controller in the DMZ using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) so as to capture Active Directory information. Over the course of the intrusion, the threat actors managed to get the credentials for a managed service provider (MSP) account, which was then used to jump from the internal domain controller to the VMware vCenter server.

CISA said the actors also moved laterally from the web server using Server Message Block (SMB) to two jump servers and an Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) server, exfiltrating cryptographic keys from the latter. The access to vCenter ultimately enabled the adversary to deploy BRICKSTORM after elevating their privileges.

“BRICKSTORM uses custom handlers to set up a SOCKS proxy, create a web server on the compromised system, and execute commands on the compromised system,” it said, adding some artifacts are “designed to work in virtualized environments, using a virtual socket (VSOCK) interface to enable inter-VM [virtual machine] communication, facilitate data exfiltration, and maintain persistence.”

Warp Panda Uses BRICKSTORM Against U.S. Entities

CrowdStrike, in its analysis of Warp Panda, said it has detected multiple intrusions targeting VMware vCenter environments at U.S.-based legal, technology, and manufacturing entities this year that have led to the deployment of BRICKSTORM. The group is believed to have been active since at least 2022.

“Warp Panda exhibits a high level of technical sophistication, advanced operations security (OPSEC) skills, and extensive knowledge of cloud and virtual machine (VM) environments,” the company said. “Warp Panda demonstrates a high level of stealth and almost certainly focuses on maintaining persistent, long-term, covert access to compromised networks.”

Evidence shows the hacking group gained initial access to one entity in late 2023. Also deployed in the attacks alongside BRICKSTORM are two previously undocumented Golang implants, namely Junction and GuestConduit, on ESXi hosts and guest VMs, respectively.

Junction acts as an HTTP server to listen for incoming requests and supports a wide range of capabilities to execute commands, proxy network traffic, and interact with guest VMs through VM sockets (VSOCK). GuestConduit, on the other hand, is a network traffic–tunneling implant that resides within a guest VM and establishes a VSOCK listener on port 5555. Its primary responsibility is to facilitate communication between guest VMs and hypervisors.

Initial access methods involve the exploitation of internet-facing edge devices to pivot to vCenter environments, either using valid credentials or abusing vCenter vulnerabilities. Lateral movement is achieved by using SSH and the privileged vCenter management account “vpxuser.” The hacking crew has also used the Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) to move data between hosts.

Some of the exploited vulnerabilities are listed below –

The entire modus operandi revolves around maintaining stealth by clearing logs, timestomping files, and creating rogue VMs that are shut down after use. BRICKSTORM, masquerading as benign vCenter processes, is employed to tunnel traffic through vCenter servers, ESXi hosts, and guest VMs.

Similar to details shared by CISA, CrowdStrike noted that the attackers used their access to vCenter servers to clone domain controller VMs, possibly in a bid to harvest the Active Directory Domain Services database. The threat actors have also been spotted accessing the email accounts of employees who work in areas that align with Chinese government interests.

“Warp Panda likely used their access to one of the compromised networks to engage in rudimentary reconnaissance against an Asia Pacific government entity,” the company said. “They also connected to various cybersecurity blogs and a Mandarin-language GitHub repository.”

Another significant aspect of Warp Panda’s activities is their focus on establishing persistence in cloud environments and accessing sensitive data. Characterizing it as a “cloud-conscious adversary,” CrowdStrike said the attackers exploited their access to entities’ Microsoft Azure environments to access data stored in OneDrive, SharePoint, and Exchange.

In at least one incident, the hackers managed to get hold of user session tokens, likely by exfiltrating user browser files and tunneled traffic through BRICKSTORM implants to access Microsoft 365 services via a session replay attack and download SharePoint files related to the organization’s network engineering and incident response teams.

The attackers have also engaged in additional ways to set up persistence, such as by registering a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) device through an Authenticator app code after initially logging into a user account. In another intrusion, the Microsoft Graph API was used to enumerate service principals, applications, users, directory roles, and emails.

“The adversary primarily targets entities in North America and consistently maintains persistent, covert access to compromised networks, likely to support intelligence-collection efforts aligned with PRC strategic interests,” CrowdStrike said.

Dec 05, 2025Ravie LakshmananVulnerability / Network Security

A command injection vulnerability in Array Networks AG Series secure access gateways has been exploited in the wild since August 2025, according to an alert issued by JPCERT/CC this week.

The vulnerability, which does not have a CVE identifier, was addressed by the company on May 11, 2025. It’s rooted in Array’s DesktopDirect, a remote desktop access solution that allows users to securely access their work computers from any location.

“Exploitation of this vulnerability could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands,” JPCERT/CC said. “This vulnerability affects systems where the ‘DesktopDirect’ feature, which provides remote desktop access, is enabled.”

The agency said it has confirmed incidents in Japan that have exploited the shortcoming after August 2025 to drop web shells on susceptible devices. The attacks have originated from the IP address “194.233.100[.]138.”

There are currently no details available on the scale of the attacks, weaponizing the flaw, and identity of the threat actors exploiting it.

However, an authentication bypass flaw in the same product (CVE-2023-28461, CVSS score: 9.8) was exploited last year by a China-linked cyber espionage group dubbed MirrorFace, which has a history of targeting Japanese organizations since at least 2019. That said, there is no evidence to suggest that at this stage the threat actor could be linked to the latest attack spree.

The vulnerability impacts ArrayOS versions 9.4.5.8 and earlier, and has been addressed in version ArrayOS 9.4.5.9. Users are advised to apply the latest updates as soon as possible to mitigate potential threats. In case patching is not an immediate option, it’s recommended to disable DesktopDirect services and use URL filtering to deny access to URLs containing a semicolon, JPCERT/CC said.

As 2025 draws to a close, security professionals face a sobering realization: the traditional playbook for web security has become dangerously obsolete. AI-powered attacks, evolving injection techniques, and supply chain compromises affecting hundreds of thousands of websites forced a fundamental rethink of defensive strategies.

Here are the five threats that reshaped web security this year, and why the lessons learned will define digital protection for years to come.

1. Vibe Coding

Natural language coding, “vibe coding“, transformed from novelty to production reality in 2025, with nearly 25% of Y Combinator startups using AI to build core codebases. One developer launched a multiplayer flight simulator in under three hours, eventually scaling it to 89,000 players and generating thousands in monthly revenue.

The Result

Code that functions perfectly yet contains exploitable flaws, bypassing traditional security tools. AI generates what you ask for, not what you forget to ask.

The Damage

• Production Database Deleted – Replit’s AI assistant wiped Jason Lemkin’s database (1,200 executives, 1,190 companies) despite code freeze orders
• AI Dev Tools Compromised – Three CVEs exposed critical flaws in popular AI coding assistants: CurXecute (CVE-2025-54135) enabled arbitrary command execution in Cursor, EscapeRoute (CVE-2025-53109) allowed file system access in Anthropic’s MCP server, and (CVE-2025-55284) permitted data exfiltration from Claude Code via DNS-based prompt injection
• Authentication Bypassed – AI-generated login code skipped input validation, enabling payload injection at a U.S. fintech startup
• Unsecure code statistics in Vibe coding – 45% of all AI-generated code contains exploitable flaws; 70% Vulnerability Rate in the Java language.

Base44 Platform Compromised (July 2025)

In July 2025, security researchers discovered a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in Base44, a popular vibe coding platform owned by Wix. The flaw allowed unauthenticated attackers to access any private application on the shared infrastructure, affecting enterprise applications handling PII, HR operations, and internal chatbots.

Wix patched the flaw within 24 hours, but the incident exposed a critical risk: when platform security fails, every application built on top becomes vulnerable simultaneously.

The Defense Response

Organizations now implement security-first prompting, multi-step validation, and behavioral monitoring that detects unexpected API calls, deviant serialization patterns, or timing vulnerabilities. With the EU AI Act classifying some vibe coding as “high-risk AI systems,” functional correctness no longer guarantees security integrity.

In March 2025, 150,000 websites were compromised by a coordinated JavaScript injection campaign promoting Chinese gambling platforms. Attackers injected scripts and iframe elements impersonating legitimate betting sites like Bet365, using full-screen CSS overlays to replace actual web content with malicious landing pages.

The campaign’s scale and sophistication demonstrated how lessons from 2024’s Polyfill.io compromise, where a Chinese company weaponized a trusted library affecting 100,000+ sites, including Hulu, Mercedes-Benz, and Warner Bros., had been weaponized into repeatable attack patterns. With 98% of websites using client-side JavaScript, the attack surface has never been larger.

The Impact

Even React’s XSS protection failed as attackers exploited prototype pollution, DOM-based XSS, and AI-driven prompt injections.

The Damage

• 150,000+ Sites Compromised – Gambling campaign demonstrated industrial-scale JavaScript injection in 2025
• 22,254 CVEs Reported – A 30% jump from 2023, exposing massive vulnerability growth
• 50,000+ Banking Sessions Hijacked – Malware targeted 40+ banks across three continents using real-time page structure detection

The Solution

Organizations now store raw data and encode by output context: HTML encoding for divs, JavaScript escaping for script tags, URL encoding for links. Behavioral monitoring flags when static libraries suddenly make unauthorized POST requests.

3. Magecart/E-skimming 2.0

Magecart attacks surged 103% in just six months as attackers weaponized supply chain dependencies, according to Recorded Future’s Insikt Group. Unlike traditional breaches that trigger alarms, web skimmers masquerade as legitimate scripts while harvesting payment data in real-time.

The Reality

Attacks demonstrated alarming sophistication: DOM shadow manipulation, WebSocket connections, and geofencing. One variant went dormant when Chrome DevTools opened.

The Damage

• Major Brands Compromised – British Airways, Ticketmaster, and Newegg lost millions in fines and reputation damage
• Modernizr Library Weaponized – Code activated only on payment pages across thousands of websites, invisible to WAFs
• AI-Powered Selectivity – Attackers profiled browsers for luxury purchases, exfiltrating only high-value transactions

cc-analytics Domain Campaign (Sep 2025)

Security researchers uncovered a sophisticated Magecart campaign leveraging heavily obfuscated JavaScript to steal payment card data from compromised e-commerce websites, with the malicious infrastructure centered around the domain cc-analytics[.]com has actively been harvesting sensitive customer information for at least one year

The Defense Response

Organizations discovered CSP provided false confidence; attackers simply compromised whitelisted domains. The solution: validate code by behavior, not source. PCI DSS 4.0.1 Section 6.4.3 now requires continuous monitoring of all scripts accessing payment data, with compliance mandatory from March 2025.

4. AI Supply Chain Attacks

Malicious package uploads to open-source repositories jumped 156% in 2025 as attackers weaponized AI. Traditional attacks meant stolen credentials. New threats introduced polymorphic malware that rewrites itself with each instance and context-aware code that detects sandboxes.

The Consequence

AI-generated variants mutate daily, rendering signature-based detection useless. IBM’s 2025 report showed breaches take 276 days to identify and 73 days to contain.

The Damage

• Solana Web3.js Backdoor – Hackers drained $160,000–$190,000 in cryptocurrency during a five-hour window
• 156% Surge in Malicious Packages – Semantically camouflaged with documentation and unit tests to appear legitimate
• 276-Day Detection Window – AI-generated polymorphic malware evades traditional security scanning

The Shai-Hulud Worm (Sep-Dec 2025)

Self-replicating malware used AI-generated bash scripts (identified by comments and emojis) to compromise 500+ npm packages and 25,000+ GitHub repositories in 72 hours. The attack weaponized AI command-line tools for reconnaissance and was designed to evade AI-based security analysis – both ChatGPT and Gemini incorrectly classified the malicious payloads as safe. The worm harvested credentials from developer environments and automatically published trojanized versions using stolen tokens, turning CI/CD pipelines into distribution mechanisms.

The Counter-Measures

Organizations deployed AI-specific detection, behavioral provenance analysis, zero-trust runtime defense, and “proof of humanity” verification for contributors. The EU AI Act added penalties up to €35 million or 7% of global revenue.

5. Web Privacy Validation

Research revealed that 70% of top US websites drop advertising cookies even when users opt out, exposing organizations to compliance failures and reputational damage. Periodic audits and static cookie banners couldn’t keep pace with “privacy drift.”

The Problem

Marketing pixels collect unauthorized IDs, third-party code tracks outside stated policies, and consent mechanisms break after updates, all silently.

The Damage

• €4.5 Million Fine for Retailer – Loyalty program script sent customer emails to external domains for four months undetected
• HIPAA Violations at Hospital Network – Third-party analytics scripts silently collected patient data without consent
• 70% Cookie Non-Compliance – Top US websites ignore user opt-out preferences, contradicting privacy claims

Capital One Tracking Pixels (March 2025)

The federal court ruled that Meta Pixel, Google Analytics, and Tealium’s sharing of credit card application status, employment details, and bank account information constituted “data exfiltration” under CCPA. The March 2025 decision expanded liability beyond traditional breaches, exposing companies to $100-$750 per incident (CCPA) plus $5,000 per incident (CIPA wiretap violations), turning routine tracking into litigation risk equivalent to security breaches.

The Defense Response: Continuous web privacy validation became the solution: agentless monitoring ensuring real-world activity aligns with declared policies through data mapping, instant alerts, and fix verification. Only 20% of companies felt confident in compliance at the year’s start; those implementing continuous monitoring simplified audits and integrated privacy into security workflows.

The Path Forward: Proactive Security in an AI-Driven World

These five threats share a common thread: reactive security has become a liability. The lesson of 2025 is clear: by the time you detect a problem with traditional methods, you’ve already been compromised.

Organizations thriving in this landscape share three characteristics:

• They assume breach as the default state. Rather than preventing all intrusions, they focus on rapid detection and containment, understanding that perfect prevention is impossible.
• They embrace continuous validation. Successful security programs operate in constant vigilance mode rather than periodic audit cycles.
• They treat AI as both a tool and threat. The same technology that generates vulnerabilities can power defensive systems. Deploying AI-aware security to detect AI-generated threats has moved from experimental to essential.

Your 2026 Security Readiness Checklist

Security teams should prioritize these five validations:

1. Inventory third-party dependencies – Map every external script, library, and API endpoint in production. Unknown code is an unmonitored risk.
2. Implement behavioral monitoring – Deploy runtime detection that flags anomalous data flows, unauthorized API calls, and unexpected code execution.
3. Audit AI-generated code – Treat all LLM-generated code as untrusted input. Require security review, secrets scanning, and penetration testing before deployment.
4. Validate privacy controls in production – Test cookie consent, data collection boundaries, and third-party tracking in live environments, not just staging.
5. Establish continuous validation – Move from quarterly audits to real-time monitoring with automated alerting.

The question isn’t whether to adopt these security paradigms but how quickly organizations can implement them. The threats that reshaped web security in 2025 aren’t temporary disruptions – they’re the foundation for years to come.

The organizations that act now will define the security standards; those that hesitate will scramble to catch up.

Dec 04, 2025Ravie LakshmananCybersecurity / Hacking News

Think your Wi-Fi is safe? Your coding tools? Or even your favorite financial apps? This week proves again how hackers, companies, and governments are all locked in a nonstop race to outsmart each other.

Here’s a quick rundown of the latest cyber stories that show how fast the game keeps changing.

If there’s one thing these stories show, it’s that cybersecurity never sleeps. The threats might sound technical, but the impact always lands close to home — our money, our data, our trust. Staying alert and informed isn’t paranoia anymore; it’s just good sense.

The threat actor known as Silver Fox has been spotted orchestrating a false flag operation to mimic a Russian threat group in attacks targeting organizations in China.

The search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning campaign leverages Microsoft Teams lures to trick unsuspecting users into downloading a malicious setup file that leads to the deployment of ValleyRAT (Winos 4.0), a known malware associated with the Chinese cybercrime group. The activity has been underway since November 2025.

“This campaign targets Chinese-speaking users, including those within Western organizations operating in China, using a modified ‘ValleyRAT’ loader containing Cyrillic elements – likely an intentional move to mislead attribution,” ReliaQuest researcher Hayden Evans said in a report shared with The Hacker News.

ValleyRAT, a variant of Gh0st RAT, allows threat actors to remotely control infected systems, exfiltrate sensitive data, execute arbitrary commands, and maintain long-term persistence within targeted networks. It’s worth noting that the use of Gh0st RAT is primarily attributed to Chinese hacking groups.

The use of Teams for the SEO poisoning campaign marks a departure from prior efforts that have leveraged other popular programs like Google Chrome, Telegram, WPS Office, and DeepSeek to activate the infection chain.

The SEO campaign is meant to redirect users to a bogus website that features an option to download the supposed Teams software. In reality, a ZIP file named “MSTчamsSetup.zip” is retrieved from an Alibaba Cloud URL. The archive utilizes Russian linguistic elements to confuse attribution efforts.

Present within the file is “Setup.exe,” a trojanized version of Teams that’s engineered to scan running processes for binaries related to 360 Total Security (“360tray.exe”), configure Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusions, and write the trojanized version of the Microsoft installer (“Verifier.exe”) to the “AppDataLocal” path and execute it.

The malware proceeds to write additional files, including “AppDataLocalProfiler.json,” “AppDataRoamingEmbarcaderoGPUCache2.xml,” “AppDataRoamingEmbarcaderoGPUCache.xml,” and “AppDataRoamingEmbarcaderoAutoRecoverDat.dll.”

In the next step, it loads data from “Profiler.json” and “GPUcache.xml,” and launches the malicious DLL into the memory of “rundll32.exe,” a legitimate Windows process, so as to fly under the radar. The attack moves to the final stage with the malware establishing a connection to an external server to fetch the final payload to facilitate remote control.

“Silver Fox’s objectives include financial gain through theft, scams, and fraud, alongside the collection of sensitive intelligence for geopolitical advantage,” ReliaQuest said. “Targets face immediate risks such as data breaches, financial losses, and compromised systems, while Silver Fox maintains plausible deniability, allowing it to operate discreetly without direct government funding.”

The disclosure comes as Nextron Systems highlighted another ValleyRAT attack chain that uses a trojanized Telegram installer as the starting point to kick off a multi-stage process that ultimately delivers the trojan. This attack is also notable for leveraging the Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to load “NSecKrnl64.sys” and terminate security solution processes.

“This installer sets a dangerous Microsoft Defender exclusion, stages a password-protected archive together with a renamed 7-Zip binary, and then extracts a second-stage executable,” security researcher Maurice Fielenbach said.

“That second-stage orchestrator, men.exe, deploys additional components into a folder under the public user profile, manipulates file permissions to resist cleanup, and sets up persistence through a scheduled task that runs an encoded VBE script. This script in turn launches a vulnerable driver loader and a signed binary that sideloads the ValleyRAT DLL.”

Men.exe is also responsible for enumerating running processes to identify endpoint security-related processes, as well as loading the vulnerable “NSecKrnl64.sys” driver using “NVIDIA.exe” and executing ValleyRAT. Furthermore, one of the key components dropped by the orchestrator binary is “bypass.exe,” which enables privilege escalation by means of a User Account Control (UAC) bypass.

“On the surface, victims see a normal installer,” Fielenbach said. “In the background, the malware stages files, deploys drivers, tampers with defenses, and finally launches a ValleyRat beacon that keeps long-term access to the system.”